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COMMENTS 
INSURANCE-REGULATION-THE EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF 
INSURANCE REGULATION~ WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON NEW 
Y ORK-Th'e past fifteen years have seen extensive examination of 
the process of regulation of the insurance industry. The recogni-
tion that insurance is interstate commerce1 has caused a reappraisal 
of the traditional system of state regulation. This examination has 
been primarily oriented toward determining whether diverse reg-
ulation by the various states is adequate in the light of the pos-
sibility of centralized federal control.2 
A basic premise used to justify state control is that the state has 
an interest in the protection of its citizens and that a state regula-
tory agency is sensitive to local abuses.3 Therefore, when one 
thinks of state regulation it is natural to assume that the regulation 
is limited to the confines of the particular state.4 However, for 
many years a number of states have imposed restrictions upon in-
surance companies which have been effective to regulate certain 
operations of the companies in other states.5 When a state asserts 
extraterritorial power, in a sense, it exercises centralized control 
over specific aspects of the industry. With the possibility of cen-
tralized federal control over at least certain aspects of insurance. 
it is in;iportant to appreciate the implications of centralized control 
as exercised on the state level. New York has been especially 
active in regulation with extraterritorial effect, and it is the purpose 
of this comment to consider the implications of out-of-state insur-
ance regulation with particular reference to New York. 6 
1 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944). See SAWYER, 
INSURANCE AS INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1945). 
2 See, generally, McConnell, "State Regulation v. State Regulation plus Regulation 
by Multiple, Decentralized, Independent Federal Agencies," 1956 INS. L.J. 697; Chellberg, 
"Regulation of Insurance-the State-Federal Controversy," 7 DE PAUL L. REv 25 (1957); 
Kimball and Boyce, "The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-
Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective," 56 MICH. L. REv. 545 (1958). 
3 Neslen, "State Insurance Supervision," 33 PROC. AssN. OF LIFE INSURANCE PRESIDENTS, 
54 at 58 (1939). 
4 Critics of state regulation claim that the inability of individual states to deal with 
problems whiclI cross state lines, e.g., national advertising, indicates the necessity for federal 
control. 
5 See, generally, State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154 (1945); 
Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Beha, (S.D. N.Y. 1928) 30 F. (2d) 539, affd. per curiam 278 U.S. 
580 (1929). Cf. Factory Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Behan, 233 App. Div. 614, 253 N.Y.S. 
562 (1931); Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938). 
6 For a general discussion of insurance regulation in New· York, see 4 BENJAMIN, AD-
MINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN TRE STATE OF NEW YORK (1942). 
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I. BASIS OF STATE CONTROL 
The power of the state to regulate the country-wide operations 
of foreign insurance companies stems from the state's power to 
exclude such companies from doing business in the state, or to 
impose conditions of admission which are not inconsistent with 
federal or state constitutional provisions.7 Of course, this power 
is not unlimited. The distinguishing factor which justifies regu-
lations with out-of-state effect is a determination that the regula-
tion is necessary for the protection of local citizens. It has been 
held, for example, that a state may not prohibit a foreign insurer 
and the citizen of another state from entering into an insurance 
contract outside the state even though the policy covers property 
within the state.8 It has even been said that regulatory statutes 
will be read not to affect a company's out-of-state operations.9 
However, a foreign insurance company has been required, as a 
condition of admission to a state, to deposit security to ensure the 
performance of obligations incurred within the state,1° to fulfill 
certain reserve requirements,11 or to have a certain amount of 
capital,12 all of which affect, at least indirectly, its out-of-state 
operations. 
Granting the proposition that the state has a legitimate interest 
in the protection of its citizens, there are limitations on the extent 
to which a state may go in providing this protection. Every New 
York regulation which affects the out-of-state operations of a com-
pany more stringently than the law of another state involves an 
exercise of New York's regulatory power within the latter state. 
This has. caused some resentment among officials of the insurance 
departments in states thus affected.13 They challenge New York's 
7 Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274 (1927); Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. 
of New York v. Brownell, (7th Cir. 1934) 68 F. (2d) 481. 
8 Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Beha, (S.D. N.Y. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 500. But see Hoopeston 
Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943). It has been held further that the state may 
not interfere with insurance contracts made outside the state. Rybasack v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 15 N.J. Misc. 266, 190 A. 308 (1937). 
9 Federal Materials Co. v. Williams-Detwiler Co., 260 Ky. 162, 84 S.W. (2d) 3 (1935). 
10 South Carolina ex rel. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McMaster, 237 U.S. 63 (1915); 
In re Norske Lloyd Ins. Co., 242 N.Y. 148, 151 N.E. 159 (1926). 
11 Cf. Bankers' Life Ins. Co. v. Howland, 73 Vt. I, 48 A. 435 (1901). 
12 Barker v. Lamb &: Sons, 99 Iowa 265, eys N.W. 686 (1896). 
13 The attitude of many state insurance officials toward New York insurance regula-
tion is summed up in the following anonymous doggerel quoted in Navarre, "Supervision 
of Insurance," 1955 INs. L.J. 299 at 301: "Great is the statute of New York State: 
It specifies just how to operate. 
And should an insurer get too independent, 
Down comes the thumb of the Superintendent ..•• " 
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right to determine what is necessary for the adequate protection 
of the citizens of forty-nine other states.14 
An examination of various provisions of the New York In-
surance Code will catalogue the areas which are typically the sub-
ject of extraterritorial regulation and may shed some light on the 
question whether criticism by other state officials is well taken. 
The statutes which will be discussed fall into two broad cate-
gories. First, those where the regulating state has no contact with 
the out-of-state transaction over which it asserts its regulatory 
power. In such a case the basis of control rests solely in the con-
trol over the admitted insurance company. Second, where the 
regulating state has some contact with the out-of-state transaction 
and therefore has additional grounds upon which to base its as-
sertion of control. 
II. STATUTES WHERE THE REGULATING STATE HAs No CoNTAcT 
WITH THE OUT-OF-STATE TRANSACTION 
Since 1906, when the Armstrong Committee15 revealed, among 
other things, the investment abuses of many of the life insurance 
companies of that time, New York has strictly regulated the invest-
ment of insurance companies in an effort to protect its citizens 
from dissipation of the insurance fund.16 All states now have 
elaborate statutory provisions governing the area of "Assets, In-
vestments and Deposits. "17 Section 90 of the New York Insurance 
Law18 requires admitted foreign insurers to "comply in substance" 
with the investment requirements and limitations imposed upon 
domestic insurers which are organized to do the same kind of in-
surance business.19 Very early this statute was held not to be an un-
constitutional attempt to control the business of foreign companies 
outside the state, but a constitutional condition of admission to 
the state.20 
14 From interviews with insurance department personnel in Illinois, Kansas, and New 
Jersey made by the author while taking part in a study of insurance regulation at the 
University of Michigan. 
15 Report of the Joint Committee of the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York, 
Appointed To Investigate Affairs of Life Insurance Companies. (February 1906) (Armstrong 
Committee Report). 
16 The first insurance company investment law was adopted in New Jersey in 1852. 
1 NEW YORK INSURANCE REPORTS 17a (1950). 
1727 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949; Supp. 1959) Art. V, §§70-104. See, generally, 
Day, "Government Regulation of Insurance Company Investments," 1954 INs. L.J. 177. 
18 27 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949; Supp. 1959) §90. 
19 See note 17 supra for citation of statutory requirements of domestic insurers. 
20 Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Beha, (S.D. N.Y. 1928) 30 F. (2d) 539, affd. per curiam 278 
U.S. 580 (1929). 
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Because life insurance companies licensed in New York hold 
approximately 83 percent of the total assets owned by all United 
States life insurance companies,21 New York is, as a practical mat-
ter, able to exercise centralized control over life insurance company 
investments. Of course, more stringent regulation by other states 
will supersede New York's centralized control, but for the most 
part New York statutes impose a stricter standard than other 
states.22 
The apparent nationwide effect of section 90 has been mitigated 
by two factors. First, the Insurance Department has been rea-
sonable in its application of the requirement of "compliance in 
substance" with investment restrictions. The New York Attorney 
General has said that in the case of foreign insurers " ... it may be 
said that the statutory investment limitations and conditions ap-
plicable to domestic insurance companies do not apply to such 
foreign insurers to the same rigid degree as they apply to domestic 
insurers."23 Second, section 90 was amended in 195824 to provide 
that foreign insurers shall be deemed to have complied in sub-
stance with the investment requirements imposed upon like do-
mestic insurers if after disallowing investments which do not 
comply with such requirements it is found that the resulting 
surplus to policyholders is not reduced below a level which is con-
sidered by the Superintendent of Insurance reasonable in relation 
to the insurers' liabilities and adequate for its financial needs.25 
It has been suggested that most foreign insurers are satisfied that 
this provision will enable them to continue their investment prac-
tices in line with the laws of their home state.26 
The New York department has made an effort to consider the 
policies of other states by cooperating with the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners, which has attempted to cen-
21 Preliminary New York Insurance Report 61 (1953), adjusted on estimated basis by 
Life Insurance Association of America nationwide figures for late 1953. See, generally, 
O'Leary, "1958 Record of Life Insurance Investments," 52 PROC. OF THE LIFE INS. AssN. OF 
AMERICA 101 (1958). 
22 For a discussion of the regulation of investment by other states, see Day, "Govern-
ment Regulation of Insurance Company Investments," 1954 INs. L.J. 177. 
231956 N.Y. Op. Atty. Gen. 177 at 178. 
2427 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949; Supp. 1959) Art. V, §90. See, generally, 
Day, "Government Regulation of Insurance Company Investments," 1954 INS. L.J. 177. 
25 See 1958 N.Y. STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 254. 
26 Barker, "Inches and Ells, Legislative Measures and the Life Insurance Industry," 
11 AMER. Soc. CHARTERED LIFE UNDERWRITERS J. 73 at 79 (1956). Cf. "Report of Committee 
on State Legislative and Legal Activities," 52 PROC. OF THE LIFE INS. AssN. OF AMERICA 87 
at 92 (1958). 
562 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 58 
tralize some of the functions of investment regulation.27 A system 
of zone examination of companies has been established. Under 
the system representatives of insurance commissioners in each of 
six zones participate in periodic examination of larger companies. 
If a company operates in only one zone representatives of only 
that zone participate in the examination. The information gath-
ered is made available to all of the insurance commissioners. The 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners has also estab-
lished a central staff, under the supervision of the Committee on 
Valuation of Securities, which values the securities held by insur-
ance companies.28 
These efforts by New York to minimize the out-of-state effect 
of its investment regulation have not been sufficient to satisfy all 
of the insurance department officials of other states. Some of 
them contend that any extraterritorial regulation is based upon 
the assumption that New York legislators have superior wisdom on 
the subject of insurance company investments as compared with 
the lawmakers of other states.29 
The financial stability of insurance companies is clearly an 
area of legitimate concern for states which seek to protect their 
insuring citizens. It is equally clear that " ... scarcely any condi-
tion can be imposed touching the financial stability of a foreign 
company, which will not involve some results elsewhere .... "30 
New York's method of application of section 90 and the recent 
amendment of that provision have, in effect, reduced it to a general 
requirement of solvency.31 Such a requirement is not unreason-
able and the mere fact that New York is somewhat more con-
servative in its determination of what constitutes solvency does 
not justify complaints by other insurance department officials if 
the requirements are not too technical or too literally applied and 
if the companies do not feel that it unduly restricts their progress.32 
Whereas section 90 authorizes New York regulation of insur-
ance company investments, section 213 of the New York Insurance 
Law33 goes to the other end of the business spectrum and imposes 
27 See Martin, "The NAIC and State Insurance Department Functions," 1952 INS. L.J. 
583. 
28 This committee makes available the publication "Valuation of Securities" which is 
widely used as an investment guide. 
29 See note 13 supra. 
SO Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Beha, (S.D. N.Y. 1928) 30 F. (2d) 539 at 542. 
31 Note 26 supra. 
32Ibid. 
33 27 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949; Supp. 1959) §§213, 213-a. 
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a variety of limitations upon expenses which may be incurred by 
life insurance companies licensed to do business in the state. For 
example, there are ceilings upon commissions which may be paid 
to agents. The restrictions apply to the nationwide operations of 
these companies.34 The extent of this control becomes apparent 
if one considers that approximately 80 percent of the ordinary 
life insurance written in the United States is written by sixty-two 
companies who are admitted to New York.35 
"Section 213 (formerly section 97) was put on the books in 
1909 as one of the fruits of the Armstrong Committee's extensive 
inquiry .... "36 It was designed to protect policyholders from high 
costs which resulted from extravagant business-producing meth-
ods.37 The life insurance industry is considerably more conserva-
tive in its marketing policies now than it was during the 1880's 
and 1890's.88 There has also been some improvement in the 
capabilities of other state insurance departments. In spite of this, 
New York continues to justify national application of section 213 
by the simple assertion that its citizens are "entitled to receive life 
insurance written by financially sound companies at reasonable 
cost."89 
This policy goes a step beyond the requirement of solvency 
which is used to justify New York's extraterritorial regulation of 
investment. Section 213 is not only aimed at ensuring that the 
insured will receive the protection he pays for but also that the 
cost of the protection will remain "reasonable." Even if one re-
gards as invalid the argument that insurance cost should be left 
to the operation of competitive forces, one can question whether 
New York is justified in imposing its own rule on the amount of 
expense incurred by the insurers on business in other states. It 
would seem that the "reasonable cost" of insurance could be 
adequately ensured to New York policyholders by applying the 
rule only to policies written in New York. This might be accom-
plished by the adoption of a rate-fixing formula similar to that 
84 The application of §213 to the out-of-state operations of foreign insurance compa• 
nies was approved by the Attorney General of New York; 1906 N.Y. Op. Atty. Gen. 549. 
85 See "Statement of Joint Legislative Committee on Insurance Rates and Regulation," 
1952 N.Y. STATE l.F.GISLATIVE ANNUAL 287. 
86 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Durkin, 301 N.Y. 376 at 381, 93 N.E. (2d) 897 (1950). 
37Ibid. 
38 STAI.SON, MARKETING LIFE INSURANCE c. 25 (1942). 
39 "Statement of Joint Legislative Committee on Insurance Rates and Regulation," 
1952 N.Y. STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 287. 
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used in the regulation of casualty insurance.40 However, the neces-
sity for additional accounting and statistical procedures for New 
York business might be unreasonably burdensome to the com-
panies. 
Section 213 has recently been amended by liberalization of the 
expense limitations in an effort to adapt it to present economic 
conditions in the· hope that it will facilitate a more efficient opera-
tion of the life insurance business.41 The limitations imposed by 
the present law do not appear unreasonable and the fact that rep-
resentatives of the industry participated in the drafting of the 
amendments42 would indicate that there is substantial acceptance 
of the statute. This conclusion is further supported by the fact 
that industry literature has been notably devoid of criticism of the 
law. However, the lack of industry opposition may be a result of 
the fact that section 213 provides insurance executives with a con-
venient excuse for holding the line on commissions and other 
expenses. In any case consent to regulation by the regulated is 
not the whole story. Forty-nine other states have a real interest 
in the application of section 213 and yet they played no part in its 
drafting or amendment, nor do they have a voice in its application 
to their own companies. 
Another New York statute, passed at the same time as section 
213, is now section 212 of the New York Insurance Law.43 This 
section imposes a limit upon the amount of standard ordinary life 
insurance which a company, licensed in New York, may sell in a 
given year on a national basis. The original law was adopted in 
an effort to encourage the growth of smaller companies and to 
disperse economic power by limiting 'the rate of expansion of the 
largest companies.44 The statute was held not to be a denial of due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Con-
stitution nor invalid under provisions of the New York State 
Constitution. 45 
40 For an excellent discussion of the process of rate-making, see Kulp, "The Rate 
Making Process in Property and Casualty Insurance-Goals, Technics, and Limits," 15 
LAW AND CONTEM. PROB. 493 (1950). 
41 For the genesis and development of the amendments, see "Statement of Joint Leg-
islative Committee on Insurance Rates and Regulation," 1952 N.Y. STATE LEGISLATIVE 
ANNUAL 287; 1953 N.Y. STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 236; Donovan, "1954 Insurance Legis-
lation," 1954 N.Y. STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 213. 
42 See "Statement of Joint Legislative Committee on Insurance Rates and Regulation," 
1952 N.Y. STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 287 at 290. 
43 27 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949; Supp. 1959) §212. 
44 Report of the Joint Committee of the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York, 
Appointed To Investigate Affairs of Life Insurance Companies. (February 1906) (Arm-
strong Committee Report) p. 289. 
41! Bush v. New York Life Ins. Co., 135 App. Div. 447, 119 N.Y.S. 796 (1909). 
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The present competitive balance in the life insurance business 
has made section 212 outmoded and unnecessary. Though the 
uselessness of the statute was acknowledged by a New York legisla-
tive committee in 1955, it was thought that "to repeal a statute of 
such long standing might involve rather lengthy consideration."46 
Instead the statute was liberally revised to permit more rapid ex-
pansion.47 Over the years the Superintendent of Insurance has 
frequently suspended the limits for various companies.48 The 
statute would appear to have very little practical impact upon the 
operations of companies, and its extraterritorial effect may be ap-
propriately discounted. 
In the area of group insurance New York has passed statutes 
which have a dual extraterritorial effect. Insurance companies 
licensed in New York are prohibited from selling policies of group 
life insurance49 and group accident-health insurance50 anywhere 
in the country at a premium which is lower than the rate prescribed 
by regulations promulgated by the Superintendent of Insurance. 
These laws establish minimum rates for the premium which is 
initially charged, applicable everywhere for companies that wish 
admission to New York. Most group insurance is written on a 
participating basis, whether it is issued by a stock or by a mutual 
company. Therefore, the policy provides for the payment of a 
dividend at the end of the policy year, based upon the loss ex-
perience under the particular policy. A New York company may, 
in fact, match the premium charges of companies not subject to 
New York law by returning to the policyholder, at the end of the 
year, a portion of the initial premium.51 This possibility reduces 
the effect of the minimum premium requirement, but the law may 
still prove to be a competitive disadvantage when a New York 
company is dealing with a prospect who is primarily concerned 
with his initial cash outlay, in competition with companies not 
admitted to New York. 
The same statutory provisions also require New York licensed 
companies which issue group life and accident-health policies to 
file with the Superintendent of Insurance schedules of commis-
sions or other allowances paid for the sale, service, or administra-
461955 N.Y. STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 307 at 308. 
47N.Y. Laws 1955, c. 749. 
48 See 1955 N.Y. STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 307 at 308. 
49 27 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949; Supp. 1959) §204 (2). 
50 Id., §221 (7) and (8). 
51 This readjustment of the rate of premium is approved by 27 N.Y. Consol. Laws 
(McKinney, 1949; Supp. 1959) §§204(2), 221 (9). 
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tion of group policies. 52 The companies are prohibited from pay-
ing remuneration anywhere in the country in excess of the rates 
last filed in New York. The object of this requirement is to make 
available for public scrutiny complete data on the marketing cost 
of various group policies.53 This facilitation of public awareness 
is not undesirable; however, it introduces a certain amount of price 
rigidity into the market. At any rate this requirement does not 
seriously infringe upon the regulatory prerogatives of other states 
in that basically it is only a requirement that information be 
furnished. 
The most recent entrance of New York into the scene as a 
nationwide regulator was in 1953 when section 226 of the New 
York Insurance Law was enacted.54 This section confers authority 
upon the Superintendent of Insurance "to issue reasonable regula-
tions prescribing standards for the equitable allocation of income 
and expenses of life insurers as between investment expenses and 
insurance expenses."65 It has the effect of allowing the superin-
tendent to establish uniform accounting procedures for life in-
surers. The statute was formulated by a Joint Committee of the 
Life Insurance Association of America and the American Life Con-
vention which conferred with the Superintendent of Insurance.50 
It would seem, therefore, that the finished product was probably 
palatable to the industry, though it does still encroach upon the 
regulatory prerogatives of other states. Indeed, the governor 
acknowledged that the statute was designed to "inure to the 
benefit of policyholders throughout the nation .... "57 
As with some other regulations the application of the require-
ment of national accounting regulations established by the New 
York superintendent could undermine the work of the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners, which is attempting to 
establish uniform reporting procedures through its Committee on 
Blanks. However, the New York superintendent seems to be try-
11227 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949; Supp. 1959) §§204(4), 221 (7). Until 1955 
this section of the law was circumvented by some companies who paid "excessive service fees 
ostensibly for the administration of the group." See 1955 N.Y. STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 
300. This was remedied by N.Y. Laws 1955, c. 650, which requires the filing of schedules 
of all compensation paid for the sale, service, or administration of group policies. 
53 See 1955 N.Y. STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 300 at 301. 
5427 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949; Supp. 1959) §226. 
551953 N.Y. STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 239 at 240. 
56 lbid. 
57Dewey, "Governor's Memoranda on Bills Approved," 1953 N.Y. STATE LEGISLATIVE 
ANNUAL 334 at 351. 
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ing to harmonize his instructions with those of the National As-
sociation of Insurance Commissioners.58 
In line with a traditional policy of maintaining separation of 
underwriting powers, New York many years ago adopted a rule 
which is now embodied in section 42 (3) of the New York Insurance 
Law.59 This rule conditions the authority of a foreign insurer to 
do business in New York upon the insurer's restriction of its na-
tional business to the kinds of business which it is authorized to 
transact in New York. Appleton's rule, as the restriction became 
designated, 00 was designed to protect the insuring public by re-
quiring that foreign insurers "shall not expose their assets to ruin 
by the doing of kinds . . . of business which are deemed too 
hazardous for New York companies."61 
Constitutional attacks upon the rule based upon the invalidity 
of the assertion of control over out-of-state business62 and the im-
pairment of the obligation of contracts03 have been rejected. 
The rule preserved for many years the distinction between the 
underwriting fields of fire and marine companies on the one hand 
and casualty and surety companies of the other, not only for New 
York operations, but for all operations of companies admitted to 
New York. However, in 1946 New York eliminated this division 
and began allowing casualty and surety companies and fire and 
marine companies to write any kind of insurance other than life 
insurance, annuities, title insurance and insurance of the life of 
property.04 This development of multiple underwriting powers 
eliminated most of the impact of Appleton's rule. 
Another provision of section 42 having extraterritorial effect is 
section 42 (5), which requires that foreign insurers comply sub-
stantially with any requirement or limitation of the New York 
Insurance Law that is applicable to domestic insurers, and which, 
"in the judgment of the superintendent is reasonably necessary to 
protect the interests of the people of [New York]."65 Although 
68 See 1956 N.Y. STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 277 at 278. 
rm 27 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §42 (3). 
60 This restriction became known as Appleton's Rule because it developed to a large 
degree while Superintendent Appleton was in office. 
6127 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §42, Historical Notes: Ins. Dept. Revision 
Note. 
62 Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Beha, (S.D. N.Y. 1928) 30 F. (2d) 539, affd. per curiam 278 
U.S. 580 (1929). 
63 People v. Seddon Underwriting Co., 140 N.Y .S. 466 (1912). 
64N.Y. Laws 1946, c. 669. 
65 27 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §42 (5). 
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this provision grants broad discretionary powers to the superin-
tendent to determine whether to grant or revoke a license, the 
power is not unlimited.66 It has been held that the superin-
tendent's licensing power does not include authority which the 
legislature has refused to grant expressly.67 Thus one must revert 
to an examination of specific statutory provisions already discussed 
to determine the extent of the powers of the superintendent to 
assert extraterritorial regulation. 
III. STATUTES WHERE THE REGULATING STATE HAS SOME 
CONTACT WITH THE OUT-OF-STATE TRANSACTION 
The statutes previously discussed represented an assertion of 
control by one state over transactions taking place in another state 
under circumstances where the state asserting the control had no 
actual contact with the out-of-state transaction. There are other 
statutes which have out-of-state effects, but they do not infringe as 
seriously upon the legislative and administrative prerogatives of 
other states since the regulating state has at least some contact with 
the transaction affected by the regulation. 
Two of these statutes have provoked some controversy. They 
are (1) the direct action statutes and (2) the resident agent laws. 
These statutes are not peculiar to New York and can therefore be 
discussed in the context of general state regulation. 
The most extensive type of direct action statute provides an 
injured party with a right of direct action against the insurer of 
the party who is alleged to have caused the injury.68 These statutes 
go a step beyond the older type of statute which allows direct action 
only if a judgment against the insured is first obtained and sub-
66 Limiting the discretion of the superintendent by requiring that referral of a license 
be "in the interest of the people" is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 
Cf. Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond 8e Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1932); 
N.Y. Central Securities Co. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932). A statute allowing the su• 
perintendent to refuse licenses "in his discretion" has been upheld. Stem v. Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co., 169 App. Div. 217, 154 N.Y.S. 472 (1915), affd. mem. 217 N.Y. 626, 111 N.E. 
1101 (1916). 
67Northwestem National Ins. Co. v. Pink, 288 N.Y. 359, 43 N.E. (2d) 442 (1942), note, 
43 Cot. L. REv. 105 (1943). 
68 This provision has been adopted in three states: Louisiana, La. Rev. Stat. (1950) 
tit. 22, §655; Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann. (1957) §85.93; Rhode Island, R.I. Gen. Laws (1958) 
§27-7-2. Rhode Island allows direct action only if the insured is not available for service 
of process. 
1960] COMMENTS 569 
sequently goes unsatisfied.6° Constitutional attack upon this type 
of legislation has been unsuccessful.70 
A direct action statute has extraterritorial effect in that it 
applies the policy of the regulating state to transactions which have 
substantial contacts with other states.71 It is important to note 
that these statutes provide a right for the protection of the citizens 
of the legislating state which can be asserted only within the state. 
The statutes do not purport to affect the rule prohibiting direct 
action as applied in other states but leave this determination to the 
legislative bodies of those states.72 
Resident agent laws have been enacted in all states.73 They 
require certain types of insurers to issue policies which cover risks 
within the state through local agents, even though the policy is 
written out-of-state.74 These laws, like the direct action statutes, 
provide for some local control over transactions which may take 
place outside the state. Whereas one is designed for the protection 
of local policyholders, the other is aimed at protecting local agents 
from out-of-state competitors who have not had to submit to the 
control of the regulating state. 75 While local preferences may not 
be economically desirable because they tend to erect tariff barriers 
between states,76 when looked at from the standpoint of their 
extraterritorial effect they are justifiable. The regulating state 
has an interest in the risk which is insured. This provides it with 
an additional contact with the transaction which is not present 
when a state is imposing its legislation upon other states merely 
60 See comment, 29 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 280 (1955). The constitutionality of the older 
type statute was upheld in Merchants Mutual Automobile Liability Ins. Co. v. Smart, 267 
U.S. 126 (1925). 
70 Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), note, 64 YALE 
L.J. 940 (1955). 
71 See Speidel, "Extraterritorial Assertion of the Direct Action Statute: Due Process, 
Full Faith and Credit and the Search for Governmental Interest," 53 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 
179 (1958). 
72 The general implications of this statute have been exhaustively written upon and a 
reiteration of these discussions is beyond the scope of this paper. See Speidel, note 71 supra, 
for a particularly good article. See also comment, 29 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 280 (1955) and 
note, 53 MICH. L. REV. 879 (1955). 
73 See note, 37 CoL. L. REv. 681 (1937). Typically the statutes also require that the 
local agent is to receive the full commission or at least a designated share thereof. 
74See, e.g., 27 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §130. The constitutionality of 
the resident agent laws was upheld in Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940). 
75 The resident agent laws were "sponsored by strong organizations of insurance 
agents .... " Note, 37 CoL. L. REv. 681 (1937). 
76 See note, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1062 (1941). 
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because the insurer is licensed to do business m the regulating 
state.77 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Extraterritorial insurance regulation by various states, partic-
ularly New York, has existed for some time.78 It is possible that 
the recognition of insurance as commerce79 has limited the grounds 
upon which a state may deny an insurance company a license. A 
showing of a more reasonable relationship between the regula-
tion and the interest sought to be protected may be required in 
order to avoid the pitfall of an unreasonable burden upon inter-
state commerce. However, the most recent opinions of the Su-
preme Court indicate that, particularly in the light of the McCar-
ran Act,80 the power of the states to impose regulation as a condi-
tion of granting a license is not significantly diminished.81 
As indicated by the discussion of the New York Insurance Law, 
the extent of New York's extraterritorial regulation is less than a 
superficial reading of the statutes would indicate. Nevertheless, 
New York and, to a lesser extent, some other states do have an 
effect on a national basis. The areas where centralized control is 
asserted by a single state which has no contact with the out-of-state 
transaction could perhaps be regulated by the federal government 
to which other states, if dissatisfied, would have recourse through 
their congressional representatives. Or, alternatively, states as-
serting extraterritorial regulation might be forced to withdraw 
from exercising centralized control by the threat of the assertion 
by the federal government of its paramount power to regulate in-
surance. 
Bartlett A. Jackson, S.Ed. 
77 Despite this contact with the transaction personnel o( various insurance depart-
ments have indicated their disapproval of the resident agent laws. From interviews with 
Insurance Department personnel in Illinois, Kansas and New Jersey made by the author 
while taking part in a study of insurance regulation at the University of Michigan. 
78 Conflicting state insurance laws were complained of as early as 1904. See Fouse, 
"State Regulation of Insurance," 24 AMER, ACADEMY OF PoLmCAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
69 at 72 (1904). 
79 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
so 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §§1011-1015. This act revested the power to 
regulate insurance in the various states, provided the state exercises this power. For a dis-
cussion of the act, see 164 A.L.R. 500 (1946). 
81 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); Robertson v. California, 328 
U.S. 440 (1946). 
